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Abstract
The increased demand for a more equal parental sharing of the re-
sponsibilities for children has led many countries to reconstruct their
parental leave systems so to provide stronger incentives for fathers to
participate in childcare. Father’s quotas are becoming widely spread
across Europe. This paper provides arguments for why it may be
welfare improving for both parents to increase the father’s share of
the family’s parental leave time. However, regulations in terms of fa-
ther’s quotas may not be optimal since it fails to recognise potentially
heterogenous preferences. Instead, self-commitment devices should be
provided in order to prevent mothers from taking too large share of
the family’s leave time.
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11 Introduction
The last three decades have seen a substantial increase in the number of votes
favoring a more equal participation of fathers and mothers in the care for
children. This development can be seen in light of the remarkable increase in
female labor force participation that has taken place in most industrialized
countries. As women gradually have taken a larger responsibility for the
breadwinning, it is argued, that also taking the full responsibility for childcare
and the household are unsustainable in the long run. Psychological research
a l s op o i n ta tt h eb e n e ﬁts for child development that comes from having
fathers taking a larger responsibility for children’s upbringing (see Russell
and Hwang, 2004, Haas and Hwang, 1999).
The trend towards more equal parenthood is also reﬂected in the family
policies conducted in modern industrialized countries. Although most family
beneﬁts were, until quite recently, targeted towards mothers, most countries
have now moved towards more gender neutral constructions of their family
policies. Considering the paid parental leave system, Sweden became the
ﬁrst country that replaced the maternity-leave system with a parental-leave
system, where the same rules applied to both fathers and mothers. After
Sweden’s implementation of parental leave in 1974, the other Nordic coun-
tries followed; Norway in 1977, Finland in 1978, and Denmark in 1984. To-
day most European countries oﬀer fathers the possibility of parental leave.1
However, although having beneﬁts where fathers are entitled to leave can be
considered a step towards more equal parenthood, the schemes were upon
introduction fully transferable between the parents (Ferrarini, 2003). And,
in practice, moving from maternity leave to parental leave has only had a
modest impact on the division of parental leave between the parents (Bruning
and Plantega, 1999).2
In order to further enhance fathers’ participation in childcare many coun-
tries have recently reconstructed their parental leave systems so to speciﬁcally
provide stronger incentives for fathers to participate in childcare. In 1995,
Sweden introduced a daddy-month which was oﬀered on an ‘use it or lose
it’ basis. If the father fails to take the leave, it simply becomes unavailable
1In 1997 the then 15 EU member states signed the Amsterdam Treaty on European
Union, which included an agreement on social policy that obligated all EU members to
provide at least three months of unpaid parental leave to both men and women (Haas,
2002).
2See Haas (1993) for the development in the US.
2to the family. This daddy-month was extended to two months in 2002. In
Iceland three months of parental leave is speciﬁcally devoted to each of the
parents, and only three months out of the total nine months can freely be
allocated between the parents. In Italy the family is entitled to 10 months
of parental leave. However, in order to encourage fathers to take time oﬀ for
parenting, the family is given an extra month if the father uses at least three
months of the family’s parental leave. In Austria, the paid parental leave
for the family is extended with six months if the father takes at least six
months of the total family leave time. Other countries that have introduced
individual non-transferable components in their parental leave systems are:
Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands and Norway.3
One may ask whether these policy initiatives, striving towards more equal
parenting, have succeeded in its aim. In fact, the eﬀects on paternal behavior
of most of these reforms have not yet been evaluated. Ekberg et al (2002)
and Eriksson (2005), however, have evaluated the introduction of the daddy-
month in Sweden 1995, and the extensions of it that took place in 2002.
The daddy-month reforms have contributed to a more equal sharing of the
paid parental leave between the parents. Ekberg et al (2004) shows that the
introduction of the ﬁrst daddy-month induced an increase in fathers’ leave
time of on average 15 days. In particular, the ﬁrst daddy-month induced the
share of fathers taking zero days to decrease from 54 to 18 percent, and the
number of fathers using around one month of parental leave to increase from
9 to 47 percent. Eriksson (2005) shows that the introduction of the second
daddy-month increased the share of fathers taking between 30 and 70 days of
parental leave with 6.1 percentage points. However, mothers still take about
90 percent of the family’s parental leave.
Although there is a trend towards more equal parenting in many countries,
the pace of this change may be regarded as low. It is often argued that the
slow pace in progress towards a more equal sharing of the responsibilities
of the children can be attributed to men. So if only fathers where willing
to take on a larger responsibility for the household and the children, the
problem would be solved. According to attitude surveys, however, this may
not be a just story. The Swedish Social Insurance Administration asked
mothers and fathers about how they thought about their own division of
paid parental leave between the spouses. The answers showed that it was
fathers that were the least pleased with the uneven distribution between
3Council of Europe, 2005.
3the spouses. And when the mothers were asked what was the main cause
of the distribution, the most frequent answer — marginally more important
than economic factors — was that it was their own preference (Swedish Social
Insurance Administration, 2003). The view that the skewed distribution has
equally well to do with mothers as with fathers, is substantiated by Australian
research. See Lupton and Barclay (1997) who used in depth interviews with
fathers and examined how couples shared the care giving and breadwinning
in the family.4
Even if research and the public opinion may be coherent in that it is
good for a child to have access to both parents when growing up, to which
exact extent the father and the mother should take part is less agreed upon.
There are arguments put forth in favour of the mother taking the main
responsibility for childcare, although other arguments stress the importance
of equal parenting. This paper does not concern which parent is the best
caretaker or what the optimal division of parental leave is — if such exists.
Rather, this paper sets out to explain why moms may use more parental
leave, and fathers may use less parental leave, than both parents initially
intended to. Thus, the paper provide arguments for why it may be welfare
improving to increase the father’s share of the family’s parental leave at the
expense of the mother’s time on leave.
The paper builds on the literature on hyperbolic preferences. We develop
a simple model with present-biased preferences for the purpose of investi-
gating mothers’ and fathers’ time use in care for children. We assume that
mothers, for exogenous biological or historical reasons, stay home with the
child during the very ﬁrst period after birth. This very early mother-child
relation founds maternal addiction to parental leave, resulting in an instan-
taneous utility loss of going back to work. For mothers with present-biased
discounting this may induce over-investment in maternal leave, from the
ex ante self’s perspective. The logic behind this is rather straightforward:
present-biased preferences give a disproportionate high weight to the instan-
taneous utility (or disutility). As the mother perceives going back to work as
an instantaneous loss of utility, traded in for anticipated future wellbeing of
4Their research was discussed in The Sydney Morning Herald 2002: "When a number
of men, some of whom earned less than their partners, raised the possibility of being the
ones to stay home, the attitude of their wives was ’no way’. There are many women who
are still resistant to allowing men that option. The whole of the discourse is that it’s a
woman’s choice. It’s never assumed to be man’s choice. It’s a very rare guy who is going
to be able to sit there and argue ’Hey, it’s my turn’".
4the child, the inﬂated instantaneous utility introduces a wedge in the eval-
uation of instantaneous utility relative expected future utility. The logic is
completely analogous to the standard example of how present-biased utility
may induce too much smoking: the smoke-addict trades of instantaneous
utility from smoking at the cost of expected future health problems.5
If, instead, the father is the sole decision maker, the inverse logic applies
to his choice of time division. As the father is working the ﬁrst period of
the child’s life, leaving work to take care of the child at home is associated
with an instantaneous utility loss although long run preferences indicates
that it is welfare improving. In the same lingo one could thus say that
the fathers become addicted to work which lead fathers to under-invest in
paternal leave.6
The paper puts a diﬀerent perspective on targeted fathers’ quotas as a
policy instrument to reach more equal parenting for mothers and fathers.
Quotas may simply prevent parents from deviating from their long run plan
of shared care taking. However, the government’s choice of quotas may not
coincide with the parents optimal sharing of childcare, which thus may induce
a larger welfare loss than the parents, although not long run optimal, choice
of sharing. As an alternative policy, the government could make available
instruments for pre-commitment; for example, having parents committing to
the employer on their return to work prior to the child’s birth. Deviating
from a pre-commitment may be costly (in terms of psychic or other costs),
which may make parents stick to their original plan of parental leave.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background of
the literature on hyperbolic preferences. Section 3 develops the model where,
without loss of generality, the mother is assumed to be the sole decision maker
when deciding on the division of parental leave between the parents. As the
model is constructed so that we can ignore savings decisions, the model is
very tractable in terms of simplicity and transparency. Section 4 introduces
5Perhaps this choice should, at least for real addicts, more accurately be seen as trading
of prevention of instantaneous disutility for the future health risks.
6We leave, however, the formal treatment of this alternative setup unexplored, since
such an exercise follows completely analogously from the study of a maternal dictator. A
similar argument can be made for a setup of bargaining between the parents. If parents
agree on the ex ante division of parental leave, both the father and the mother can improve
their instantaneous utility by deviating from the plan by having the mother using more
maternity leave, and the father using less paternity leave, than they both initially intended
to.
5heterogeneity in preferences as well as uncertainty, and investigates the wel-
fare implications of regulations and self commitment devices. We show that
instruments providing self-commitment devices always outperforms fathers’
quotas. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The driving mechanism in this paper is that of hyperbolic preferences. In-
tertemporal decisions are normally modelled with the discounted utility model
(DU) introduced by Samuelson (1937). Empirical research on intertempo-
ral choice has, however, documented various inadequacies of this model as
a description of behavior (see Fredrick et al. 2002 for an overview of the
anomalies of DU). Strotz (1956) was the ﬁrst to relax the assumption of
constant discounting in a theoretical model of intertemporal choice.7 Re-
search on animal and human behavior has led psychologists to conclude that
discount functions are approximately hyperbolic (Ainslie 1992). Hyperbolic
preferences yields a bias towards the present, i.e. the present is given dispro-
portional weights in intertemporal decisions. This leads to time-inconsistent
behavior in the sense that the choice between at time T trading of x utility
units for y units the next day, is not independent of when the choice is made.8
There is by now a vast literature on applications of hyperbolic preferences:
Laibson (1997, 1998) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) explore the im-
plications of hyperbolic discounting for consumption-saving behavior. They
show that hyperbolic discounting leads a person to consume more than she
would like (that is under-save) from a prior perspective. O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a, 2001) show that hyperbolic discounting leads some persons to
put oﬀ (procrastinate) an onerous activity more than she would like from a
prior perspective.
Hyperbolic discounting has also been used as an explanation for addiction.
Most of the earlier literature on addiction relied on habit formation, which
captures the reinforcement aspect of addiction since present consumption
7Strotz (1956) also highlights that the DU assumption is a rather strong limitation to
the general intertemporal utility function. In the view of this, one may ask why the burden
of proof seems to lie heavily on economists departing from the DU assumption, but rather
soft on those adopting the DU assumption.
8Speciﬁcally, if x is a utility gain and y is a utility loss, a bias towards the present
makes the individual more likely to accept the trade the closer she comes to the time T.
6aﬀects tomorrows taste. The main paper on this is Becker and Murphy (1988)
in which addiction is formed and maintained by fully rational and forward
looking individuals. Gruber and Koszegi (2001) and O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2002) recognize however that this kind of addiction doesn’t capture the
time-inconsistent behavior embodied in addiction (Most addicts are after
all not rational, they can at some point in time rationally desire to quit in
the future, but fail to do that when future arrives). In their model, habit-
formation thus yields preference for consumption of the addictive product,
but the actual decision to consume those products is explained mostly by
hyperbolic preferences. Our paper relies on these two ideas.
3 The Model
3.1 Assumptions
The model is deliberately stylized and simple. A representative biological
mother (simply referred to as ’the mother’ henceforth) is the sole decision
maker. This assumption could be relaxed by letting either the father be the
sole decision maker, or let there be within family bargaining. The only deci-
sion variable is how the parental leave should be split between the parents.
There are only 3 periods. The ﬁrst two periods take place when the child
is very little and need parental care. The third period, on the other hand,
is the rest of the child’s life. In period 1, consisting of the ﬁrst x months
after birth, the mother will be on parental leave the full period due to strict
biological or historical reasons. In period 2, consisting of y months, the di-
vision of parental leave between the mother and a second caretaker (simply
r e f e r r e dt oa s’ t h ef a t h e r ’h e n c e f o r t h )i sm a d ee x c l u s i v e l ya tt h em o t h e r ’ s
discretion. Period 3 is the rest of the child’s life in which no decisions are
modelled. However, the mother has a prior notion of how the child’s future
wellbeing is aﬀected by the preceding division of parental leave between the
mother and the father. The explicit assumptions regarding the three periods
are presented below.
3.1.1 Period 1 — The ﬁrst x months
As mentioned above the mother is the sole caretaker for strict biological or
historical reasons during the ﬁrst x months, i.e. m1 = x,w h e r em1 denotes
the mother’s number of months in parental leave during the period. x is a
7strict exogenous variable. No decisions are made concerning the present but
a plan for the future division of responsibility is traced out. Depending on
whether there is a commitment tool at hand or not, the plan will hold in the
future.
3.1.2 Period 2 — The next y months
During the second period, consisting of the exogenously given y months pro-
ceeding the ﬁrst period, both parents can be potential care givers. The
mother has positive instantaneous utility from being on parental leave. This
should be interpreted in relation to the disutility from going back to work.
One potential underlying explanation for this may be that the mother is ’ad-
dicted’ to being on leave with the child. The addiction stems from the fact
that the mother stayed at home during the ﬁrst period.9
It would be a simple modelling exercise to endogenize the addiction for-
mation; however, since we assume that the mother is home for exogenous
biological reasons the ﬁrst x months, such exercise would not add much dy-
namics to the model. For elaborated endogenization of addiction and habit
formation featuring present-biased utility, see e.g. Gruber and Koszegi (2001)
and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002).
Let the mother’s instantaneous utility, from staying home with the child,
be given by u2(m2) where m2 is the number of months she stays home with
the baby in the second period. Furthermore, u2(.) is strictly concave and
increasing, i.e. u0
2(.) > 0 and u00
2(.) < 0. u2(.) should thus be interpreted as
the net instantaneous utility surplus that the mother experiences when being
on parental leave instead of working.10
9Note that the results of this model would materialize as long as the mother considers
going back to work to be aﬄicted with an instantaneous loss of utility; provided of course
that she is the decision maker. However, with the addiction story the results also generalize
to a model where the work addicted father is the sole decision maker, or when there is
bargaining between the spouses. The analogous result would also hold in any setup in
which the mother gets positive instantaneous utility from being home with the child,
while the father does not.
10Clearly, this model considers the utility values induced by time use rather than returns
from consumption. Savings options need thus not to be modelled. However, the fact that
men earn higher wages than women could, in a broad way, be accounted for in this set-up.
For a given parental leave time, x + y,e a c ht i m ep e r i o dt h ef a t h e ri ss t a y i n gh o m ea s
the care taker instead of the mother is associated with a monetary loss equal to the wage
diﬀerential. In terms of the numeraire, this induces a utility loss for each unit the father
stays home in the second period. Thus, the utility loss in period 2 of having the father
83.1.3 Period 3 — The rest of the child’s life
We assume that the mother has a prior notion that the child will beneﬁti n
its future life from having spent time, during the early period, with both its
parents. Explicitly, we model this as the mother having a subjective optimal
time division, of the ﬁrst x+y months. Deviations from this optimum result
in expected subjective utility losses. Let the mothers prior time division
be m∗ ≡ x + m∗
2 (the residual optimal time spent with the father is thus
d∗ = y − m∗
2). We deﬁne the mother’s expected utility function — based on





L(.) is a positive convex loss-function with L0(.) > 0 for (m2 − m∗
2) > 0 and
L0(.) < 0 for (m2 − m∗
2) < 0. The Inada conditions are L0(0) = 0, L(0) = 0
and lim
m2→yL0(m2 − m∗
2)=∞,i . e .w h e nm2 approaches y, so that the mother
takes the full parental leave, the marginal expected future damage to the
child will approach inﬁnity.11
3.2 The Mother’s Problem
Two features of the model simplify the calculations. First, the exogenous
given division of parental leave in the ﬁrst period makes the calculation of the
decisions for the latter periods straightforward since history is exogenously
given. Second, no actual decisions are made in the third period, even if
the mother is accounting for the consequences of her earlier decisions on
the third period wellbeing. Thus there is no third period decision which
aﬀects the earlier decisions. The only variable to decide upon is the second
period division of the parental leave. This decision can be made in the ﬁrst
period or the second period. The decision made in the ﬁrst period about the
forthcoming division of parental leave will generally be followed only if there
is a commitment technology available. Otherwise her second period decision,
which generally diﬀers from the ﬁrst period’s decision, will be carried out.
staying at home (having the mother working), captured by u0
2(.) > 0 and u00
2(.) < 0, could
also capture the gender wage diﬀerential, not accounting for the savings option.
11This last condition guarantees the optimal choice of m2 <yand thus provide an
interior solution.
93.2.1 Commitment
When we have a commitment devise, the mother decides already in the ﬁrst
period on how the parental leave should be split between the parents. As
the instantaneous utility in the ﬁrst period, u1 (x), is exogenously given, this
term can be ignored when formalizing the mothers problem. The mother’s
maximization problem may be written as
max
m2
U1 ≡ βu2(m2) − βL(m2 − m
∗
2) (2)
where β<1 is the hyperbolic component attached to all future as in the
standard (β,δ)-model ﬁrst used by Phelps and Pollak (1968). The (β,δ)-
model catches the qualitative features of hyperbolic preferences, where δ
represents the DU component of the intertemporal choice, i.e. the traditional
constant discount factor. The traditional discount factor is, without loss of
generality, set to unity throughout our analysis. The FOC to (2) with respect











which implicitly solves for the optimal m2 with commitment. Since u0
2 is
positive, L0 also has to be positive and thus mc
2 ≥ m∗
2.T h u s , t h e m o t h e r
overspend time with the baby compared to what she ﬁn d st ob eo p t i m a l
for the child. The reason is that she also accounts for the direct utility she
receives from spending time with her child.
3.2.2 No Commitment
In period 2, the problem facing the mother will instead be
max
m2















2 implicitly. This is similar to (3) except for the β-term.






Normally, following Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968), one distinguishes be-
tween two types - naifs and sophisticates. The naifs are unaware of that their
10preferences are time-inconsistent while the sophisticates know this, which
makes them take account of future decisions in their present decision. (Tech-
nically one solve the problem by backward induction for the sophisticates). In
case of non-commitment, the solution usually diﬀers for the two types. In our
case, no decisions are taken in the third period. Therefore, the sophisticates’
solution coincide with the naifs’ given by (5).













which means, loosely speaking, that higher bias towards the present (lower
β)i n c r e a s e smnc
2 while it has no eﬀect on mc
2 (see 3). When β approaches
unity, the non-commitment solution will naturally approach the commitment
solution. β introduces no distortion between the beneﬁt, in period 2, and the
loss, in period 3, when the mother is standing in period 1 and committing
to a future path. The parameter β is attached to all future. However, when
standing in period 2, β applies only to the perceived future disutility from
spending (too much) time with the baby. When no prior commitment has
been made the mother will thus, in the view of her period 1 self, overspend
time with the baby in period 2. The problem becomes more severe the lower
β is. When β → 0 we are sure to approach the corner solution m2 → y,a n d
the mother thus takes the whole parental leave.
The assumption of the mother as the sole decision maker can be relaxed
if we assume that the father has the same kind of preferences, that is an
instantaneous utility from working in period 2, and a qualitative similar prior
about the child’s future. The same rationale behind the mother’s preferences
justify the ﬁrst assumption - the father is addicted to his work since he
worked during the ﬁrst period and there is a psychological cost of starting to
take part of the parental leave. With these assumptions the same qualitative
bias results if the father decides upon the division of parental leave, or if the
decision making is modelled as a negotiation.
4 Policy Implications
To do welfare analysis, we make the usual assumption that the long run im-
partial self has β =1(see e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a)). The time
11consistent long run self thus correctly predicts and internalizes future pref-
erences. In our case, the commitment maximization problem coincides with
the long run maximization problem, because the decision in the ﬁrst period
only concerns future periods (which are discounted the same), since the ﬁrst
period utility is exogenously given. The commitment solution thus maximizes
welfare whereas non commitment yields a sub optimal division. From a policy
perspective, regulating the division of the parental leave between the parents
by setting m2 = mC
2 is welfare improving. For time inconsistent mothers,
regulation alters the division from the sub optimal non-commitment division
to the optimal commitment division. Time consistent parents on the other
h a n dw o u l dh a v ec h o s e nt h es a m eo p t i m al commitment division anyway.
4.1 Heterogenous Mothers
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ei n d i v i d u a l sa r eh e t e rogenous with respect to the instanta-
neous utility of childcare, u2(m2), a regulated division can no longer reach
the ﬁrst best solution. The analogous result hold for heterogeneity in the
loss function as well (or in m∗
2). But for simplicity we only provide the for-
mal analysis for heterogeneity in u2(m2). Assume that we have two types of





j = A,B, that appear in relative fractions  A and  B =1−  A.T h eg o v e r n -











− βL(m2 − m
∗
2) (6)
An alternative policy tool is to provide a self-commitment devise that
allows the parents in the ﬁrst period to commit to a certain self chosen
second period division of the parental leave. If such a devise is at hand, each
type commit to the optimal division given by their commitment solution,
and we reach the ﬁrst best solution. The utilitarian social welfare function













































with equality only when ν
A(.)=ν
B(.) (8)
Provision of a self-commitment device naturally outperforms regulation, since
it allows diﬀerent division of parental leave for diﬀerent types.
4.2 Uncertainty
A ni m p o r t a n tr e a lw o r l df e a t u r ei st h a tp r e f e r e n c e sm i g h tc h a n g eo v e rt i m e .
If a mother has pre-committed to a future maternal leave schedule, she may
ex post ﬁnd it optimal to deviate from the staked out path because of changed
preferences and not because of time inconsistency. Ideally, we would like to
separate the ex post deviation tendencies and allow for deviations due to
altered preferences but not for time inconsistency induced deviations. It is,
however, unrealistic to assume that the government is able to separate the
two types of deviations. We must therefore depart from the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o n
w h e nt h e r ei sf u t u r ep r e f e r e n c eu n c e r t a i n t yi n v o l v e d .A sw ew i l ls h o wb e l o w ,
this does not shift the preferred policy towards more regulation; instead
the soft paternalism approach, in which the government’s role is limited to
providing the individuals with commitment tools, is still the more attractive
strategy.







2), j = A,B, occurring with prob-
abilities pj and qj =1− pj, respectively. The government’s optimization


























− βL(m2 − m
∗
2) (9)
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13By comparing (9) and (11), (8) holds once again.
Uncertainty in itself thus gives no scope for more hard paternalism, i.e.
strict regulations instead of mere instruments for self-commitment. However,
in the above analysis we have assumed that the individuals have correct antic-
ipation of their expected future preferences. A more hard-core paternalistic
approach could of course be legitimized had we assumed that the government
knew the individuals’ future utilities with greater certainty that the individ-
uals do themselves. But such assumptions are indeed highly unorthodox in
the ﬁeld of mainstream economics. Finally we may note that all of the above
leaves out externalities, imposed on society as a whole, from the individuals’
choices of parental leave. As always, externalities may, at least in theory,
constitute the raison d’être of less laissez-faire.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Family policy in general and parental leave in particular have indeed been
hot topics in the last three decades’ European policy debates. Considering
the massive increase in female labor supply this comes as no surprise. That
there is a scope for more equal sharing of the parental duties could be argued
both based on equality considerations and with reference to the childrens’
future well-being. This paper, however, has left all such issues aside and
focuses on a particular mechanism that may make mothers take too long
parental leave from their own long-run perspective.
The model presented here is a very stylized and simple story of a mother’s
choice of maternal leave. We assume that mothers, for exogenous biological
reasons, stay home with their child during the very ﬁrst period after birth.
This very early mother-child relation founds maternal addiction to parental
leave, resulting in an instantaneous utility loss of going back to work. For
mothers with present biased discounting this could induce over-investment
in maternal leave, from the ex antes self’s perspective. The assumption
of parental leave addicted, and dictative, mothers is not the only one that
generates this key result. The analogous logic applies had the work-addicted
fathers made the decisions instead. And in case the whole household gets
instantaneous disutility, due to income loss, when switching from maternal
to paternal leave, the logic applies irrespective of who makes the parental
leave decision.
Furthermore, in the policy section we provided rationale for using self
14commitment instead of regulation as a means to maximize long run welfare.
Since self commitment utilizes the individuals’ own preferences, heteroge-
neous mothers may choose their own optimal level of commitment. Provision
of a self-commitment device thus naturally outperformed regulation, since it
allowed diﬀerent division of parental leave for diﬀerent mothers.
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